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Title IIIofthe SuperfundAmendments andReauthorizationActof1986seeks 
to reduce the risks of chemical accidents through a strategy of indirect 
regulation that relies onproviding the public with information about chemi­
cal1uJzards. For thisstrategy to be effective, citizensmustaggressively utilize 
the information provided to monitor industrial practices and press for risk 
reduction. Sinceprior research suggests it is very difficult to evoke the degree 
of citizen action thai would be required to make a strategy of indirect 
regulation successful, and since thefederal legislationprovided nofunds for 
implementation, there is a question o/whether the structures set up by Title 
III are sufficient to achieve its objectives. This article reports the results of 
a national study thatexaminedselectedaspects ofthe implementation ofTitle 
II! in an effort to assess the likely outcome o/its attempt at indirect regulation. 
Ourfocus is on the degree to which the Title Ill-mandatedLocalEmergency 
PlanningCommittees arepursuingpolicies that are likely to get thenecessary 
information to citizens aOOfosler community debate on hazardous materials 
issues. 
Each year billions of pounds of hazardous chemicals are released into the 
environment by tens of thousands of finns in the U.S. (Environmental Protection 
.:\gency, 1991). Many billions more pounds of these chemicals are manufactured. 
stored, and transported, posing both acute and chronic risks to human health and 
environmentalquality (Goldman, 1991). How is government to respond to sucha large 
and complex problem? What regulatory mechanisms are possible? 
Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 
(SARA), also known as The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act, was an effort to address the issue ofchemical hazards. Title ill is a departure from 
traditional regulatory policy, offering an excellent example of an approach to regula­
tion that is increasingly advocated for dealing with health and environmental issues. 
Passed in the aftennath of thedevastating chemical accident in Bhopal, India, in 1984, 
SARA Title TIl was an effort both to encourage communities to prepare for chemical 
emergencies and to set in motion events that would lead to reductions in the risks of 
such incidents (Hadden, 1989; Musselman, 1989). 
The .fIrst objective was pursued through the frequently used federal strategy 
of placing mandates on state governments and private industry. Every state was to 
create a system of Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) which were to 
identify potential sources of hazardous materials accidents in their communities and 
develop integrated plans for responding to emergencies. Industries handling hazard­
ousmaterials were to report selected facts about their operations to theLEPCs in order 
to facilitate the development of emergency response plans. These plans were to be 
submitted toa TitleIII-mandatedS tateEmergencyResponse Commission (SERC) for 
approval by October, 1988. 
It was in pursuit of the goal of reducing chemical hazards that Title ITI was 
innovative. Rather than imposing specific demands for risk reduction measures on 
industry, Title In pursued an indirect strategy that relied on providing the public with 
infonnation. Legislators apparently hoped that requiring rInns to share data on their 
use of hazardous materials would both provide a vigilant public with the infonnation 
it needed to monitor industry perfonnance and cause industry to undertake voluntary 
risk-reduction efforts in order to reassure citizens and prevent both potential legal 
actions and political pressure for more fonnal regulation (Administrative Conference 
of the United States, 1989; Baramt Dillon, & Ruffle, 1990). To this end, Title III 
requires that LEPCs receive from industry specified data on hazardous materials and 
provide that infonnation to citizens on request. SARA also mandates a nationwide, 
computerized system of information on releases of hazardous materials which the 
public can access, known as the Taxies Release Inventory (TRI) (Goldman, 1992). 
In addition, the LEPCs are charged with tasks which could contribute to an 
increasedpublic awareness andencourage a communitydialogueaboutenvironmental 
hazards (Hadden & Bales, 1989; McNeil, Arkin, & McCallum, 1989). First, the very 
composition of the local emergency planning committees encourages public discus­
sion of chemical hazards. Title III requires that each committee include police, fire, 
civil defense, public health, hospital, and transportation officials, as well as represen­
tatives of facilities subject to Title III reporting requirements, citizens' grouPSt the 
media, and elected local officials. The LEPCs' primary role is to prepare and update 
integrated local emergency response plans for their communities. But they are also to 
involve the public in the planning process and to make available to the public 
infonnation on the presence of hazardous materials in their communities and any 
release of these chemicals into the environment. 
If the "regulation through information" strategy ofTitle In is to be effective 
in reducing chemical risks, theLEPCs must succeed in alerting the public to chemical 
hazards and in providing them with the information they need to hold industry and its 
public sector regulators accountable. In additiont the public must accept the challenge 
and aggressively utilize the information provided. However, prior research has found 
that it is very difficult to evoke the degree of citizen action that would be required to 
make indirect regulation of environmental hazards successful (Baram, Dillon, & 
Ruffle, 1990; Pease, 1991). In addition, because federallegjslation provided no funds 
for implementation of Title III, most LEPCs operate with highly limited budgets and 
staff support. This raises the question of whether the structures set up by Title TIl are 
sufficient to achieve its objectives. 
This article reports the findings of a study that examined selected aspects of 
the implementation of Title III in an effort to assess the likely outcome of its strategy 
of indirect regulation. Our focus is on the degree to which the LEPCs are, in fact, 
pursuingpolicies thatare likely to get needed infonnation to citizens and thereby foster 
community debate on hazardous materials issues. Our analysis is based on data 
obtained from both a national survey ofLEPCs and their members, and case studies 
ofthree communities,also on information derived from less systematic observation of 
many other state and local agencies charged with Title lIT responsibilities. It is 
important to note at the outset thatTitle lIT places very few explicit responsibilities for 
active risk communication on the LEPCs and that there are substantial differences of 
opinion among infonned persons about how proactive the LEPCs should be in their 
efforts to inform the public about risks. Nothing we say here should be construed as 
a criticism of local LEPCs and their members, who for the most part are volunteers 
working with little or no budget or staff. This research is primarily an examination of 
the adequacy of an approach to achieving national policy objectives. Where there are 
shortcomings, it is often because that approach has left the LEPCs with insufficient 
resources or ambiguous directives. 
the Survey of LEPCs and Their Members 
SinceTitleIII gives theLocalEmergencyPlanning Committeesa crucial role 
in providing the public with infonnation on hazardous materials risks, we sought to 
learn how the committees defined their responsibilities and what actions they took to 
fulfill those responsibilities. The virtual impossibility of obtaining a complete and 
unbiased lis t ofnames and addresses ofall LEPC members dictated against attempting 
to survey a random sample of the nation's LEPC members. Moreover, there is 
significant variation in the way individual states have organized their LEPCs in the 
absence ofspecific directions in the federal legislation (National Governors' Associa­
tion,1990). This made it important to sample in such a way as to allow meaningful 
comparisons of states. Consequently, we selected a sample of states judged to be 
typical (if notrepresentative in a statistical sense) of the nation and attempted to survey 
all LEPCs in each of those states. 
In choosing states for the sample, we sought to include: (a) one state from 
each of the EPA's 10 administrative regions to capture the effects of any variation in 
EPA regional pmctice with regard to Title III's provisions; (b) states likely to include 
LEPCs thatweremakingconcertedefforts to involve thepublic in theTitle III planning 
process or experimenting with creative approaches to risk communication, to give us 
a basis for comparing different approaches; (c) an overall balance among urban and 
rural areas and among areas with high and low concenlrations of hazardous materials­
handling facilities; and Cd) examples of the range of ways in which states have been 
divided into LEPCjurisdictions. Application of these criteria led us to select the states 
of Alabama, California, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Rhode Island, 
Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
In January, 1989 (after the October, 1988, deadline for completion of local 
emergency response plans) we sent the chair ofeach of the 388 functioning LEPCs in 
these states a packet containing an LEPC Infonnation Fonn requesting data on the 
committee itself, and a set ofquestionnaires for the individual committee members. A 
cover letter asked the chair to (a) complete the Infonnation Form, (b) distribute the 
individual questionnaires to the members, and (c) collect the completed question­
naires, and mail all materials back to us. After dropping LEPCs that were uinactive" 
or thatcouldnotbecontacted, theoverall responserate forLEPCsas organizations was 
56%. There was, however, significant variation in response rate by state. For the sake 
ofbrevity,wewill notdiscuss state-by-stateresults in thisreport. (Informationonstate­
level data can be found in Conn, Owens, and Rich, [1990].) 
The committees that sent in Information Forms reported a total of 4,461 
membership positions. We received 1,468 individual responses. This translates into 
an average individual response rate of 30% (though there was substantial variation 
among LEPCs). We judge this response to be adequate for two reasons. First, our 
observations indicate that most LEPCs depend primarily on the efforts of a core of 
active members and that many nominal members are only marginally involved in the 
committees. It is theactive members who are most likely to understand the functioning 
of theLEPCs and to influence their operation. Since they are also most likely tobe the 
ones attending a meeting at which the questionnaire was distributed and most likely to 
have the knowledge and interest to fill out a questionnaire. it may be that we have a far 
better sample ofactivemembers than ofall members. Moreover, wemay have a more 
accuratepictureoftheLEPCs from theresponses ofthis activecore than wewouldhave 
gained from a larger sample of less involved members. Second. most of the patterns 
found in the responses we received are so strong that there is little reason to believe that 
having additional responses would have altered our basic conclusions. 
Ourdata collection procedure may havealloweda disproportionate response 
from themoreactive, betterorganized local committees because their officers aremore 
likely to be willing to take part in such a survey and to be able to contact their members 
and persuade them to participate. In addition, we probably got responses primarily 
from the more involved and concerned members of these committees since they are 
more likely both to have been at a meeting to receive the questionnaire and to be 
interested enough to complete it. We have no way of contacting nonresPOnders to 
detennine if this bias actually exists in our data, but readers should be aware that our 
results may possibly be biased in favor of a positive picture ofLEPC activities. 
In an effort to discover what steps the LEPCs had taken to make hazardous 
materials infonnation available to citizens, we asked LEPC chairs if their committee 
had taken each ofa series ofsteps. Table 1 shows that, whilemost committees had put 
in place the basic structures necessary for making infonnation available to the public, 
significant numbers had failed to take steps that could be vital to effective information 
sharing. For example. 41% had not actively advertised the existence or location of the 
office responsible for responding to citizens' requests for hazardous materials infor­
mation. Without these efforts, there is little reason to expect citizens to know where 
to go with questions. Similarly, almost a third of all LEPCs did not provide citizens 
with assistance in interpreting hazardous materials infonnation. Given the technical 
nature of this infonnation, such assistance may be essential ifcitizens actually are to 
gain an understanding of the risks they face by examining Title III infonnation. 
Table 1 • A ". hilEPC's Reported Efforts to Make Hazardous Materials Inf~nnatlon val a e 
to the Public 
Activity 
Designated an office to disseminate information 
Advertised the address and phone number of this office 
Full-time employee given responsibility for office 
Provide photocopying service at the office 
Offer citizens assistance interpreting hazardous materials 
information 
% of 
LEPC's 
92% 
59% 
77% 
78% 
67% 
Perhaps one reason that LEPCs might not make the sharing of Title lIT 
infonnation a high priority is that they have received too few requests for such 
infonnation to feel that thepublic is concernedwith hazardousmaterials issues. In fact, 
530/0 ofLEPCs in our sample reported that they had received no requests, and88% had 
received fewer than 10 inquiries. Only 5 organizations claimed to have received 50or 
morerequests. The average number of requests reported by all LEPCs was 4.5. We 
can think of several reasons for the small nwnber of requests: it may reflect a lack of 
public concern or insufficient time (since the passage of SARA) for people to know 
about the existence ofLEPCs and the availability of Title III infonnation. However, 
we believe that inadequate efforts by LEPCs to infoIm the public are a major factor. 
We note, for example, that there are weak. but positive and statistically significant 
correlations between the number of requests received and whether the LEPC had (a) 
advertised the existence ofan office to provideTitle III information (r=.16; p<.Ol); (b) 
invited the public to attendLEPC meetings (r=.15; p<.02); and (c) sentrepresentatives 
to address other organizations (r=.13; p<.05). 
We investigated the efforts ofLEPCs to involve the public in developing or 
updating the local response plan by asking chairs to tell us how frequently their 
organization had used each ofseveral possible techniques for gaining public inputand 
infonning thepublic ofLEPC activities. Table2 shows thatmore organizations report 
having used the first two methods of disseminating infonnation-methods which 
place the burdenofaction on others--while fewer relied on the next threemethods that 
require more outreach. We also asked if the LEPCs had developed a "press kit" to 
provide the local media with infonnation for use in covering the Title III planning 
process and the most likely hazardous materials emergencies in their community. Only 
4% said they had such a kit. 
Table 2 
LEPC Efforts to Involve the Public in Response Planning 
Activity % of LEPC's Doing It: 
Mean 
Frequently Never Frequencya 
Invited the media to 
cover LEPC activities 41% 3% 3.9 
Placed announcements 
of LEPC meetings 43% 9% 3.8 
Invited public attendance at 
LEPC meetings 250/0 24% 2.9 
Sent representatives to other 
organizations 13% 26% 2.8 
Held public hearings or 
meetings on Title III 12% 35% 2.4 
Published the response plan 
for the public 6% 46% 2.1 
Note: 8Qn a five-point scale in which 5 represents "frequently" and 1 represents 
"never.u 
Since their members' perceptions of the local committees' mission will 
profoundly influencewhat theLEPCs actually doabout risk communication,weasked 
an open-ended question about what the members saw as the most important purpose 
of the LEPC after the response plan has been approved. Sixty-four percent gave an 
answer which had to do with maintaining the emergency response plan -updating it 
and coordinating it with otherplans. Only 13% referred to educating the public about 
hazardousmaterials issues, while 10% said that providing the public with information 
about hazardous materials risks would be the LEPC's key purpose. The remaining 
members gave answers that fell into a wide range of other categories. This suggests 
that the members generally do not see the role of the LEPCs as shifting toward public 
education once the plan is in place. 
We also asked members to evaluate their committee's capacities in several 
areas, using a five-point scale. The responses summarized in Table 3 indicate that) as 
a group, members are highly confident of their organization's ability to handle 
planning tasks, but far less sure of its capacity for communicating with the public or 
environmental groups" and quite dissatisfied with the degree to which it has achieved 
public visibility or confidence. This pattern also appeared in members' assessment of 
the likelihood that their LEPC could accomplish each of several goals. Table 4 
summarizes these answers by showing the percentage ofmembers who said that the 
LEPC had a "better than 50/50 chance" of accomplishing the goal, and the average 
rating on a five-point scale in which "5» represented "very likely" and "1" corre­
sponded to "not likely." While the majority were confident of their ability to achieve 
the more technical communication goals, minorities felt that the LEPC could effec­
tively reach citizens or stimulate debate on environmental issues. 
Table 3 
Members' Evaluation of Their LEPC 
Characteristic 
Competent and dedicated members 
Capacity for communicating with government 
Capacity for communicating with business 
Infonnation gathering capacity 
Capacity for analyzing information 
Relations with news media 
Communication with environmental groups 
Communication with the public 
Public confidence in ability to protect the 
community's interests 
Public visibility 
% Rating Good Average 
or Excellent Rating 
78% 4.0 
74% 4.0 
67% 3.8 
65% 3.8 
62% 3.7 
58% 3.6 
44% 3.4 
42% 3.3 
32% 3.2 
23% 2.8 
Note: 3Qn a five-point scale in which 5 represents "excellent" and 1 represents "poor." 
Table 4 
Members' Assessment of the Likelihood of Accomplishing Goals 
Goal Percent Saying Average 
Better Than 50/50 Ratinga 
Respond effectively to requests 
for information 
Improve community understanding 
of risk infonnation 
Infonn citizens of the plan's 
provisions 
Secure adequate citizen input for 
updating plan 
Stimulate discussion of 
environmental issues 
76% 4.0 
52% 3.6 
400/0 3.3 
34% 3.1 
33% 3.1 
Note: aan a five-point scale where 5 represents "very likely" and 1 represents &&not 
likely." 
Two groups that can help the LEPCs reach the public or that can create 
problems for the committees are local environmental organizations and the media. 
Accordingly, we sought to assess members' perceptions of the relationships between 
their LEPC and these groups. First, we asked them Lo rate the frequency of LEPC 
contacts with environmental groups on a five-point scale. Only 14% said that their 
committee had relatively frequent contact with such organizations, while 570/0 
described contacts as relatively infrequent. In assessing the character of interactions 
with environmental groups, 350/0 ofLEPC members described these contacts as closer 
to cooperation than confrontation. while 13% said that the contacts were more nearly 
confrontational than cooperative, and the majority rated contacts as neutral in charac­
ter. While these responses indicate that it is uncommon for environmental groups and 
LEPCs to cooperate, there is some evidence that increased contacts between environ­
mental groups and the LEPCs might produce better working relationships. In the fIrst 
place, LEPC members who described contact as more frequent were more likely to 
describe those contacts as cooperative rather than confrontational (r=.51; p<.OOOl). 
and those who saw contacts as more frequent were also more likely to say that they 
viewed local environmental activists as representative of the general public in their 
community (r=.21; p<.OOOl). 
In an additional effort to assess LEPC members' perception of their 
organization's external relations, we asked them to rate the amount and q~ty ~f 
coverage that the LEPC receives from television, radio, and newspapers ill therr 
jurisdiction. As shown in Table 5, majorities rated all three types of coverage as 
insufficient and substantial percentages evaluated the quality of the coverage .as less 
than adequate. IfLEPC members were correct that their work does not receIve the 
attention itdeserves from the media. this could partially explain the low level ofcitizen 
interest in learning about hazardous materials issues. suggested by the small number 
of requests for Title In information reported above. 
Table 5 
Members' Views of Media Coverage of LEPC Affairs 
Percent of Members Who: 
Rate Amount of Coverage Rate Quality of Coverage 
Type of Media As Less Than "Enough"a As Less Than "Fair"b 
Newspaper 59% 330/0 
Radio 67% 45% 
Television 81% 580/0 
Note: aBased on a five-point scale in which 1 represented "too little," 3 represented
 
Uenough," and 5 represented "too much."
 
bBased on a five-point scale in which 1 represented "poor," 3 represented "fair,u and
 
5 represented "good."
 
The impression that LEPCs show little sign of moving to a more active role 
in risk communication is reinforced by members' responses to a question about how 
much time they devote to each of several tasks. Table 6 shows that members report 
giving significantly less time to outreach efforts (infonning the public of hazardous 
materials issues and seeking public input) than to more narrowly focused planning and 
capacity-building activities. One explanation ofthis may be that LEI><: members view 
outreach as primarily the responsibility of the committee chair. Examining the time 
allocation of chairs separately. however, reveals that while chairs report giving more 
time to all tasks than other members, they too devote significantly less time to outreach 
than to other functions. 
This allocation of time stands in stark contrast to members' answers to our 
question about the value of public input in evaluating and updating the response plan. 
Forty-seven percent indicated that such input was "very important/' while 430/0 rated 
it as usomewhat important," and only 9% labeled it as "not very important." Perhaps 
members were only giving what they considered to be the "politically correct" answer 
Table 6 
lEPC Members' Allocation of Time 
Activity
 
Studying hazardous materials issues
 
Gathering infonnation
 
Attending LEPC meetings
 
Hazmat response training
 
Evmuatinginfonnation
 
Informing the public
 
Seeking public input for the
 
planning process
 
Note: alncluding the LEPC chairs.
 
Average Hours Per Month Allocated By: 
AU Members8 Chairs Only 
4.9 4.5 
2.7 3.5 
2.5 3.4 
2.0 2.8 
1.7 3.4 
0.7 0.9 
0.6 1.1
 
to this question. It is also JX>ssible, however, that members do value citizen input but 
do not know how to go about securing it in practice. Interestingly, LEPC chairs were 
less likely than others to say that citizen input was valuable to the planning process. 
Only 38% rated it as "very importanttt while 48% said it was "somewhat important,tt 
and 14% said that citizen involvement was "not importanttt Given the crucial role of• 
LEPC chairs in directing the committees' activities, their relatively low commitment 
to citizen participation may help explain why so little effort goes into seeking citizen 
input. 
Divisions Within the LEPCs 
SARA's Title illmandates that the LEPCs be drawn from several constituent 
groups in order to provide broad-based representation of the community on the 
committees, and in the hope of improving risk communication by ensuring that the 
committees have strong links to the community. How well have these goals been 
realized? 
Responses to our survey indicate that 560/0 of committee members had a 
college degree and 32% had graduate education. Occupationally, 26% were in fields 
that qualified them as emergency responders Qaw enforcement, fire protection, rescue 
squad), 240/0 were business managers or owners, 13% were public administrators, 2% 
were elected officials, 9% were in the health care field, and 3% worked in the media. 
This profile suggests thatLEPC members are a diverse group in some respects but are 
not a cross section of the general public. They are far more likely than "the average 
citizen" to be well educated, professional, and affiliated with government and 
emergency response organizations. 
We asked the members to tell us if they felt that they had been appointed tD 
the local committee because of their affiliation with any of several groups. Table 7 
summarizes their responses by reducing the groups to 5 categories. "Watchdog 
groups" include environmental groups, community organizations, and the media. 
Only 20/0 of our respondents saw their membership on the LEPC as a product of 
affiliation with an environmental group, while less than 4% saw themselves as 
representatives of the media and less than 4% identified with community organiza­
tions. The "independent"group, whodidnotfeel that theirappointmentwasassociated 
with membership in any of the typesofgroups we listed, cameprimarily from business 
andgovernment. Table7 also shows thatLEPC chairs were even less likely to feel that 
they wereappointedbecauseoftheir affiliation with a "watchdog"group,whilealmost 
half identified their affiliation with government as the source of their appointment. 
In an effort to determine if the diversity in members' backgrounds results in 
different perspectives on issues before the LEPCs. we compared these five groups' 
responses to a variety of questions about the LEPC. This comparison (summarized in 
Table 8) revealed no consistent pattern of statistically significant differences 
among the groups' answers. Especially noteworthy is the fact that the "watch~ 
dog" group generally does not stand out from the other groups in its responses to 
any of the questions in our study. The one point on which watchdog members are 
statistically distinctive is in their viewoftheLEPC's relations with the media. On that 
subject. watchdog group members were more positive than the other groups. 
Table 7 
Group Affiliations of LEPC Membersa 
Group % of All Members % of Chairs 
Only 
Emergency responders 29% 160/0 
Government officials 29% 46% 
Business and industry 210/0 16% 
"Watchdog" groups 10% 60/0 
Independents 12% 140/0 
Note: aBased on members' assessment of the reason for their appointment. 
Table 8 
Attitudes and Perceptions of Different Groups of lEPC Members 
% of Group That: Responders Business Government Watchdog Independents 
Rates communication 
with government as 
excellent 26% 23% 35% 32% 31% 
Rates communication 
with public as excellent 11% 7% 11% 10% 14% 
Rates communication 
with envirorunental 
groups as excellent 10% 8% 10% 14% 16% 
Rates relations with 
media as excellent 22% 15% 25% 38% 17% 
Rates cooperation 
with business as 
excellent 16% 25% 20% 18% 20% 
Sees contact with 
environmental groups 
as cooperative 11% 10% 11% 13% 11% 
Sees LEPC's public 
visibility as good 21% 21% 21% 25% 28% 
Sees public confidence 
in LEPC as good 31% 26% 31% 22% 36% 
Rates citizen input to 
planning as important 52% 38% 44% 49% 55% 
Describes local environ­
mental concerns as high 32% 33% 40% 37% 34% 
Sees local environ­
mentalists as representative 
of the public 46% 41% 53% 51% 45% 
This high level of agreement among LEPC members could be viewed as a 
sign ofeffective groups who share a consensus on most issues. However, italso could 
reflect a flawed selection process in which only those members of watchdog groups 
whowill not"makewaves" arerecruited for theLEPCs. Selecting watchdogmembers 
by this criterion might facilitate assembling the emergency responseplans on time, but 
having less critical watchdog members may prevent the LEPC from encouraging 
public debate of environmental risks. 
Case Studies 
In an effort to understand the dynamicsbehind thenational survey results)we 
conducted case studies in three communities in which exceptional efforts were being 
made to reach the public with infonnation on hazardous materials risks.Wesoughtout 
these atypical cases in order to discover which communication strategies might be 
effective and to provide a test ofwhat could realistically be expected of the system set 
up under Title III. To select the cases we spoke with EPA regional and state 
environmental officials~ as well as representatives of environmental and citizens' 
groups from across the nation. While our sources could identify very few valid 
examples of active risk communication programs anywhere in the country, we were 
able to confmn suitable case studies in three very different areas. These were (a) a 
heavily industrializedrural area of25J)()() people in a Southern state, (b) a mid-size city 
and surrounding county ofjust under400,000 people in a Rocky Mountain state, and 
(c) an urbanized West Coast county with a population of approximately 750~OOO. 
Wevisited eachofthe casestudy communities andmetwithLEPCmembers, . 
emergency response officers, public officials. media figures, and others who were in 
a position to be familiar with environmental issues in the community. Through a total 
of 30 in-depth interviews we obtained (a) detailed infonnation regarding the risk 
communication programs~ (b) insights from the risk communicators based on their 
experiences, and (c) information from which to identify a sampleofopinion mediators 
in each community for a follow-up mail survey. 
These case studies were notdesigned to assess the adequacyofthe individual 
risk communication activities carried out in each of the communities. Rather, they 
allow an overall assessment of the capacity of the LEPCs for effective risk communi­
cation. 
The activities we observed were carried out by LEPCs in cooperation with 
public agencies, citizen groups, and industry. This cooperation is quite common 
because LEPCs seldom have an operating budget or paid staff and must often rely on 
other organizations to finance and/or assist with the execution of any public outreach 
efforts. These projects represented a significant investment ofeffort for the organiza­
tions involved. Our observations, however, indicated that they fell far short of what 
would be necessary (in our opinion) to raise public awareness levels enough to create 
a system of "indirect regulation.1t 
In the frrstpJace, very little ofwhatwe saw in thecase studies qualifies as true 
risk communication. The infonnation communicated tended to focus on matters such 
as the existence of the emergency response plan, and what to do in an emergency. 
Topics such as the natureofthe risks facing the community and the probability ofhann 
commonly were not addressed. Given that we chose to examine communities where 
special communication efforts werebeingmade, wemay reasonably assume lhat even 
less risk communication is being undertaken in most other communities. 
Second, LEPC members are not public relations or communications experts 
and, as a result, had overlooked significant flaws in their communications efforts. 
Examples include the following. Publications often were notdesigned so as to capture 
citizens' attention or communicate technical information effectively. Materialplaced 
inpublic libraries was very difficult to locatebecause itwas not cross-referenced under 
tenTIS that lay persons are likely to know to use (like "pollution" or "chemicals") and, 
once found, this information generallywasnot in a fonn thatcitizens couldunderstand. 
Citizens who had attended public forums on hazardous materials issues said they 
involved primarily the one-way provision of technical information beyond the 
comprehension of most audiences, and did not encourage dialogue. Local media 
figures tended to feel that most LEPC activities were not "newsworthy" and that they 
had not been recruited as allies in the effort to educate the puhlic. 
The surveys of opinion mediators in these three coromunities provide an 
indicator of the impactof the LEPCs' risk communication efforts. The purpose of this 
survey was to gather infonnation on issues such as the amount ofpublic concern over 
hazardous materials, the level ofpopular awareness ofemergency response plans, and 
the sources that citizens relied on for information on hazardous materials. The sample 
was composed of a group of persons who might reasonably be expected to serve as 
opinion mediators in their communities. It included local political officeholders and 
leaders of civic groups, neighborhood organizations, environmental groups, parent­
teacherassociations, health organizations, and the business community. Thesepeople 
couldplayavital role in distributing hazardousmaterials infonnation to thecommunity 
through their organizational contacts. 
We received responses from 104 of the 221 individuals to whom question­
naires were mailed, for an overall response rate of 47%. While this number of 
respondents is low, there are several reasons to think the results are valuable. In 
response to most of the questions there are very strong patterns that are consistent with 
the information we obtained while in the communities. Moreover, with the exception 
of questions about the level of public concern over hazardous materials in the 
individual communities, the responses in all three localities were highly similar. 
Because of this latter fact, we will present the responses from all three communities as 
a single group. 
Only 28% of the respondents said they feel personally well-infonned about 
what types of hazardous materials emergencies are most likely to occur in their 
community, and only 11% said that they knew what to do to protect themselves and 
their families in the event ofa major hazardous materials emergency. While 64% said 
they knew that citizens have a legally established right to infonnation about hazardous 
materials in their community, only 30% were aware that an organization in their 
community had conducred a hazards analysis and had developed an emergency 
responseplan. When asked to identify theorganizationwhich developed theplan, most 
of the respondents who claimed to know about its existence mentioned a government 
agency such as the fire or emergency services department. TheLEPC was mentioned 
by name only twice in all the responses. 
Given the makeup of the group to which the questionnaire was sent» it is 
reasonable to expect that the general public in these communities is even less familiar 
with these issues. Such an assumption is consistent with the respondents' perception 
of the public's awareness of the emergency response plan. When asked to rate public 
awareness on a scale in which "1" represented "not aware" and US" stood for "highly 
aware," one-third of respondents chose a rating of "1" and a majority rated public 
awareness as a "1" or u2." 
There is no indication that the respondents knew how to learn more about 
hazardousmaterials issues through anymechanism associatedwithTitleIII. Only 16% 
claim to have seen an explanation of the process by which citizens can learn about 
hazardous materials risks under Title Ill's community right-to-know provisions. 
When asked an open-ended question about where they would turn for infonnation 
about hazardous materials handled by a given fmn in their community. respondents 
most frequently mentioned a local public agency such as the health. frre, or police 
department. Only four people mentioned the LEPC by name. It is worth noting, 
however, that76% ofouropinion mediators said they would spend two hours studying 
the hazards analysis and emergency response plan for their community, if it were 
available; 71 % said they would attend a two-hour public meeting to address these 
issues; and81% said theywould spend30minutesa weekreadingnewsarticles orother 
materials to keep up-to-date on these issues. While these responses may be overly 
optimistic. they suggest that attentive citizens may be willing to invest time in 
increasing their understanding of hazardous materials risks if given the opportunity. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The results of this study strongly suggest that the arrangements made for 
implementation of SARA Title III are insufficient to make the "regulation-through­
information" strategy fully effective. Our confidence in the accuracy of thesefindings 
is enhanced by the fact that they are consistent with those reported in other studies of 
LEPCs. (For examples. see Lindell & Meier, 1991; Lyon, 1989; Pease. 1991; and 
Sutton. 1989.) Furthennore, although our study was conducted in the early stages of 
Title In implementation, we believe that our findings still apply. This belief is based 
in part on infonnation obtained through infonnal contacts (e.g., Kartez. 1992). 
A great deal of effort has gone into gathering infonnation on hazards and 
developingemergency response plans. However, we have seen no evidence to suggest 
thatpublic awarenessofhazardous materials issues is being raised to the degree needed 
to make the assumptions of indirect regulation operative. Most Local Emergency 
Planning Committees in our study have focused on the technical aspects of their job 
and have not made a concerted effort to bring hazardous materials issues to public 
attention. This is quite understandable given the constraints under which they labor. 
They generally run entirely on volunteereffortand have littleorno independentbudget 
or staff. Their mission has been defined primarily in tenns ofdeveloping a teehnically 
adequateemergency responseplan. As a result. they have few members with extensive 
backgrounds inpublic relations, citizen participation, or communications. Mostmake 
risk communication a low priority and do not know how to go about obtaining public 
involvement even when it occurs to them to attempt to do so. Moreover, most have 
been given very litde direction from the state or federal government concerning their 
role in nonemergency risk communication, so that responsibility for this important 
function is seldom clearly assigned at the local level. 
As presently structured, LE~scannot be expected to serve as a catalyst for 
activepublicmonitoringoflocalenvironmental risks. They lacknotonly the resources 
necessary for such an effort, but also the political motivation. Given the selection 
processes that are commonly used, LEPC members are likely to regard local govern­
ment or industry as their main constituency. While ensuring public safety is accepted 
as their primary mission. most LEPCs have little contact with the public or even with 
community organizations that could introduce a citizens' perspective. The persons to 
whom they feel most immediately accountable are most often their private sector 
employers or their public sector supervisors. Moreover, many key members come 
from emergency response backgrounds that stress one-way communications with the 
public (in order to ensure compliance with emergency instructions) and make little 
room for questioning or critical analysis of options. Under these conditions. it is 
unrealistic to expect LEPCs to attempt to foster public debate ofenvironmental issues 
or to focus on hazard reduction rather than emergency response. 
Since the currentbudget climatemilitates against any large infusion offunds 
into risk communication efforts. the question becomes: What strategies might make 
the LEPCs more effective risk communicators and what tactics might they use to raise 
public awareness within the constraints of existing policy and institutions? We need 
to go beyond the specific findings of this study to draw on more general observations 
and our larger understanding of the dynamics of hazardous materials risk communi­
cation to answer this question. Accordingly. the recommendations that follow cannot 
be defended by specific data in all cases. Even so, we feel that they will stand up to the 
test of implementation. 
It is important to recognize that the fonnal requirements ofTitle III regarding 
the provision of hazardous materials information to the public can be fulfilled in a 
largely passive fashion. As a result, even though the spiritofthe law may requiremore. 
local policymakers with limited resources typically will want to know what benefits 
they can expect from a hazardous materials risk communication effort. The first task, 
then, is for state and federal agencies vigorously to promote the idea that .there are 
highly practical reasons why communities should have a proactive risk communica­
tion program. We have discussed these reasons in other work (Conn. Owens. & Rich, 
1990). They relate to both the practical effectiveness ofemergency response plans and 
the political wisdom of infonning citizens of dangers in advance of any foreseeable 
accident. 
Perhaps thekey factor thatcould facilitate effective risk communication is the 
LEPCs' development of a clear concept of their role in such an effort. We argue that 
they should be encouraged by theEPAand state agencies to adopt the role ofplanning 
for and advocating active risk communication by other organizations. It is as unrealistic 
to expect them actually to carry out significant risk communication efforts as it would 
be to ask them to conduct actual emergency response activities (such as tire fighting). 
They shouldplay to their strength as planningorganizationsand develop a comprehen­
siveplan for pre-emergencyandemergency risk communication in their communities. 
This plan should be made a fonnal part of the emergency response plan, and 
responsibility for its implementation should begiven to agencies with the resources to 
do the job. Indeed, in those communities that have engaged in risk communication 
efforts associated with the LEPCs, the actual work on and financial support for the 
programs have been provided by a local government agency, or by an industry or 
citizen group, working in collaboration with the LEPC. 
Even iftheLEPCs' role is limited to planning risk communication programs, 
their membership should be diversified to include more media representatives1 and 
more members with skills in community participation. These latter might include 
members ofcommunity and environmental groups as well as public officials with the 
requisite skills. In order to encourage the developmentofstrongworking relationships 
between theLEPCs and community groups, we would argue that existing regulations 
concerningLEPCcomposition shouldbeamended fonnally torequire thatatleastone­
fourth of the membership bedrawn from local environmental and community groups. 
To open the membership more generally, there should also be public announcement 
of the appointment of persons to the LEPC and provisions for the public to nominate 
individuals to serve. 
Finally, it is important to recognize the complexity and difficulty ofcommu­
nicatingriskinfonnation in apre-emergency situation. There is apparently a good deal 
of natural resistance among the public to learning about such threats and very little 
theory on which to base effective communications efforts (Handmer & Penning­
Rowsell, 1990). Accordingly, it is unreasonable to expectLEPC members to be able 
to plan a risk communicationsprogram without significan t assistance. Werecoffitnend 
three lines of attack. First, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of 
Energy, the Federal Emergency Management Agency. and other concerned federal 
agencies should step up their efforts to encourageand support LEPCs in planning and 
executing pre-emergency risk communication programs. Since the federal agencies 
themselves currently do not have all the knowledge they need to advise others on 
mounting effective programs,this will require the further development and validation 
(e.g., by field testing) of techniques for informing the public about risks and involving 
them in decisions about risk reduction and emergency response. Second, all agencies 
should encourage the sharing of information on techniques of this kind. For example, 
areas with nuclear power plants and areas accustomed to natural disasters such as 
hurricanes, floods, or earthquakes, may already have in place significant programs to 
infonn the public about the nature of these risks and the proper course of action in an 
emergency. It may be possible for the LEPCs to learn from their experience. to share 
channelsofcommunication, and/or to draw on someofthe sameresources in arranging 
information campaigns. State and federal agencies should establish institutional 
frameworks to facilitate these exchanges. Finally, while it may be unwise to attempt 
to bring risk communication specialists onto the LEPCs as full-time members, most 
committees could benefit from the services of a communications advisory committee 
to assist in developing a risk communication plan and reviewing specific projects. 
Rich/Conn/Owens: Indirect Regulation ofEnvironmental Hazards 
Each LEI'<:; should be encouraged to tap into the media, advertising, health, and 
academic communities in their area to recruit such an advisory group. 
Our observations revealed that few LEP(;s are aware of what other organi­
zations are doing in the risk communication area.2 However, State Emergency 
Response Commissions (SERes) can play an important role in solving this problem 
because they arewell situated to gatherinfonnation on risk communication efforts and 
to share this infonnation with LEPCs. We therefore recommend that SERCs become 
clearing houses for such infonnation and make concerted efforts to bring LEPC 
members together periodically to discuss risk communication and to participate in 
workshops on involving and infonning the public. 
The overall objective of these changes is not only to increase the capacity of 
the LEPCs to fulfill their risk communication role, but, more importantly, to make the 
LEPCsgenuine corrununityorganizations thatcan serveas mechanisms through which 
thepublic can help makedecisions about how to respond to thechemical risks thatexist 
in their community. 
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Notes 
IWe recognize that there are potential conflicts of interest to be resolved before the media 
members can be fully effective. See Burkhart (1990) for a discussion. 
"We are trying to address this problem ourselves through the publication of Hazardous 
Matuials Dialogue. 
References 
Administrative Conference of the United States. (1989) Risk communication as a regulatory alternative 
for protecting hEalth, safety and environment. Washington, DC: Author. 
Baram, M. S., Dillon P. S., & Ruffle, B. (1990). Managing chemical risks: Corporate response to SARA 
Title Ill. Medford, MA: Tufts University, The Center for Environmental Management. 
Burkhart, F. N. (1990). Journalists as bureaucrats? Perceptions o/media roles in local em£rgency 
planning. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Risk Analysis, New 
Orleans, LA. 
Conn, D. W' t Owens, W. L., & Rich, R. C. (1990). Communicating with the public about hazardous 
materials: An examination oflocal practice (EPA reportNo. 230-04-90-077). Washington, 
DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
Environmental Health Center (1989). Chemicals, the press and the public: A journalist's guide to 
reporting on chemicals in the community. Washington, OC: National Safety Council. 
Environmental Protection Agency. (1991). Toxics in the community: National and local perspectives 
(EPA report No. 560/4-91-014). Washington, DC: Author. 
Goldman. B. A. (1991). The truth about where you live. New York: Random House. 
Goldman. B. A. (1992). Community right to know: Environmental infonnation for citizen participation. 
Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 12, (3), 315-325. 
Hadden, S. G. (1989). A citizen's right to know: Risk communication and public policy. Boulder. CO: 
Westview Press. 
Hadden,S. G .• & Bales. B. V. (1989). Riskcommunicationabout chemicals in yourcommunity.' A manual 
for local officials (EPA report No. 230-09-89..Q66). Washington. DC: U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
Hance, B.	 J., Chess, C., & Sandman, P. (no date). Improving dialogue with communities: A risk 
communication manualfor government. New Brunswick, NJ: New Jersey Departn1ent of 
Environmental Protection. 
Handmer,J., & Petming-Rowsell, E. (Eds.). (1990). Hazards and the communicationoJrisk. Aldershot, 
England: Gower Publishing Co. 
Kanez, J. (1992). {Evolving roles of LEPCs in hazard management]. Unpublished raw data. 
Lindell, M. K., & Meier, M. J. (1991). Effectiveness of community planning for toxic chemical 
emergencies. Lansing, MI: Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Environmental 
Response Division. 
Lynn, F. M. (1989). Citizen involvemenJ in using community right-to-know informationJor emergency 
planning and source reduction. Paper presented at the Arumal Meeting of the Air and Waste 
Management Association, Los Angeles, CA. 
McNeil, C., Arkin, E. B., & McCallum, D. B. (1989). Toxic and hazardous substances, Title III and 
communities: An outreach manual for community groups (EPA report No. 56-1-89-002). 
Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Toxic Substances. 
McCallum, D. B.• Hammond, S. L., Morris, L. A., & Covello, V. T. (1990). Public knowledge and 
perceptions ofchemical risks in six communities: Analysis ofa baseline survey (EPA report 
No. 230-01-90-074). Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
Musselman, V. C. (1989). Emergency planning and community right-to-know: An implementer's guide 
10 SARA Title lli. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. 
National Governors' Association (1990). The emergency planning and community right-to-lcnowacl: A 
status ofstate actions. Washington, DC: National Governors' Association. 
National Research Council. (1989). Improving risk communication. Washington, DC: National 
Academy Press. 
New Jersey Department of Enviromnental Protection, Division of Science and Research (no date). 
Improving dialogue with communities: A risk communication manual for goverfVrU!nl. 
Pease, W. S. (1991). Responses to information about chemical hazards.' Evaluating the'efficacy ofright 
to know programs in California. Paper presented at the Meeting on Interdisciplinary 
Approaches to the Study of Economic Problems. Stockholm, Sweden. 
Sulton, V. V. (1989). Perceptions oflocal emergency planning committee members' responsibility for 
risk communication and a proposed model risk communication program for local emergency 
planning committees under SARA Title m. Unpublished Dissertation, University of Texas 
at Dallas. 
